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PRECAP; Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C. v. Alborn,
Uithoven, Riekenberg, P.C.
Victoria Dettman
I. QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Did the district court err in finding the shareholder agreements,
containing partially restrictive covenants not to compete, unenforceable
because they lacked an essential term, were “agreements to agree,” and
were unconscionable contracts of adhesion? If the district court did err—
and the shareholder agreements are enforceable—are the partially
restrictive covenants not to compete reasonable under Dobbins, DeGuire
& Tucher, P.C. v. Rutherford, MacDonald and Olson,1 and can the
employer show a legitimate business interest in enforcing the covenants
under Wrigg v. Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C.?2
This case is noteworthy because Montana law is unsettled on the
issue of whether an employer has a legitimate business interest in
enforcing a restrictive covenant when the employee chooses to end the
employment relationship. If the Court reaches that issue, this case could
guide attorneys in drafting enforceable partially restrictive covenants not
to compete.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Montana accounting firm Junkermier, Clark, Campanella,
Stevens, P.C. (“JCCS”) brought this action alleging Terry Alborn, Paul
Uithoven, Christina Riekenberg, Joe Bateson, and Sherm Veltkamp
(“Shareholders”) breached their Shareholder’s Employment Agreements
(“Agreements”) and fiduciary duties to JCCS.3
JCCS was established in 1946 in Great Falls and has expanded
throughout Montana by merging with and acquiring various accounting
firms.4 JCCS wished to expand to Bozeman and in the year 2000 began
merger discussions with Bozeman firm Veltkamp, Stannebein & Bateson,
P.C. (“VSB”).5 The two entities eventually merged on January 1, 2002;
JCCS paid for VSB’s assets with JCCS shares and VSB dissolved.6 VSB

1

708 P.2d 557 (Mont. 1985).
265 P.3d 646 (Mont. 2011).
3
Appellant’s Opening Brief at 1–2, Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C. v. Alborn,
Uithoven, Riekenberg, P.C., Terry Alborn, Paul Uithoven, Christina Riekenberg, Joe Bateson, and
Sherm Veltkamp , https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/DA%2015-0605%20Appellant’s%20
Opening%20–%20Brief?id=%7BF05C4752-0000-CE17-BD41-BE04DF468C34%7D (Mont. Jan.
14, 2016) (No. DA 15-0605).
4
Id. at 3.
5
Id. at 4.
6
Id.
2
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had four shareholders at the time of the merger: Uithoven, Bateson,
Veltkamp, and Stannebien, All four became JCCS shareholders.7 Alborn
became a JCCS shareholder in 1980 and moved to the Bozeman JCCS
branch after the merger with VSB.8
The Shareholders signed identical Agreements following the
merger.9 The Agreements were for a term of one year, but a vote of 75%
of the directors could terminate them without cause.10 The Agreements
provided for compensation a “mutually agreeable amount.”11
Additionally, the Agreements contained a partially restrictive covenant not
to compete, confined to the instant and any contiguous county.12 Partially
restrictive covenants not to compete infringe upon, but do not
unequivocally prohibit, one’s right to perform his or her trade. The
covenant stated, in pertinent part:
If this Agreement is terminated for any reason and the Shareholder
provides professional services in . . . competition with JCCS, the
Shareholder agrees . . . to pay JCCS an amount equal to one hundred
(100%) percent of the gross fees billed by JCCS to a particular client over
the twelve month period immediately preceding such termination . . .13
All JCCS shareholders signed new Agreements on July 1, 2011.14
Subsequently, the Agreements were extended by one year on July 1,
2012.15 Therefore, the Agreements were set to expire on June 30, 2013.16
In 2013, the Shareholders voluntarily left JCCS after meeting with
an independent consultant and having discussed their decision to leave
with JCCS.17 Shareholder Alborn directed a JCCS employee to download
JCCS’s electronic client list in June 2013.18 The Shareholders formed a
new accounting firm, Amatics CPA Group, which opened on July 1,
2013.19 Amatics advertised and sent solicitation letters to JCCS’s
Bozeman clients.20 Over the next year, 2,100 of JCCS’s 2,400 Bozeman
clients moved their business to Amatics.21

Appellee’s Brief at 3, Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C. v. Alborn, Uithoven,
Riekenberg, P.C., Terry Alborn, Paul Uithoven, Christina Riekenberg, Joe Bateson, and Sherm
Veltkamp , https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/DA%2015-0605%20Appellee’s%20Response
%20–%20Brief?id=%7B601BF652-0000-CD10-B8D0-56BEE9239902%7D (Mont. Feb. 12, 2016)
(No. DA 15-0605).
8
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 4.
9
Id. at 5; Appellee’s Brief, supra note 7, at 3.
10
Appellee’s Brief, supra note 7, at 3.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 5–6.
14
Appellee’s Brief, supra note 7, at 4.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id. at 5.
19
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 10.
20
Id. at 12.
21
Id.
7
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The Bozeman JCCS office eventually closed.22 JCCS then
commenced this action, seeking declaratory judgment enforcing the
Agreements’ covenants not to compete and alleging numerous causes of
action, including breach of contract.23 Both parties moved for summary
judgment on JCCS’s action for declaratory judgment and breach of
contract claim. The district court granted the Shareholder’s motion
(thereby denying JCCS’s motion), finding the Agreements unenforceable
because they lacked an essential term (compensation), were “agreements
to agree,” and were unconscionable contracts of adhesion.24 Because the
district court found the Agreements unenforceable, it held they could not
serve as basis for JCCS’s breach of contract claim.25 Therefore, the district
court never reached the issue of whether the partially restrictive covenants
in the Agreements were reasonable.26 JCCS now appeals the district
court’s ruling. There are multiple issues on appeal, including fiduciary
duty owed, breach of fiduciary duty, proof of damages, and attorneys’ fees.
However, the pivotal issue discussed below is that of the Agreements’
partially restrictive covenants not to compete.
III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
A. Appellant Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C.
1.
The District Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment to the
Shareholders on the Basis That the Agreements Are Unenforceable.
JCCS argues the district court erred when it found the Agreements
unenforceable because they lacked an essential term, were “agreements to
agree,” and were unconscionable contracts of adhesion.
JCCS asserts the Agreements had all essential terms. JCCS
contends the district court improperly relied on distinguishable case law
to conclude compensation was not adequately contemplated in the
Agreements.27 JCCS asserts the Shareholders were compensated for their
work pursuant to the Agreements.28 Additionally, JCCS argues the amount
of the Shareholders’ salary is irrelevant to the issue of whether the partially
restrictive covenant is enforceable, thus asserting that the covenant is not
made unenforceable by the mere omission of a dollar figure.29

22

Id.
Id.; Appellee’s Brief, supra note 7, at 1–2.
24
Appellee’s Brief, supra note 7, at 10.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 30.
28
Id.
29
Id.
23
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JCCS asserts the Agreements are not “agreements to agree.”30
JCCS argues that the amount of the employee’s salary does not need to be
included in the Agreement because the amount of the employee’s salary is
not consideration for the covenant not to compete.31 Instead, the
employment itself is the consideration.32 Therefore, JCCS concludes the
Agreement contemplates the parties’ full agreement.33
Supported by eight peer accounting firms as amici curiae, JCCS
also argues that the Agreements are not unconscionable contracts of
adhesion.34 JCCS argues the Agreements are not contracts of adhesion
because the Shareholders were not in an inferior bargaining position as
officers, shareholders, and in the case of one shareholder, a director.35
JCCS asserts the Shareholders were on equal footing with JCCS to speak
up about changes they wished to make to the covenants.36 JCCS contends
the Agreements were effectively agreements the Shareholders entered into
with themselves and not unconscionable contracts of adhesion.37
2.
The District Court Erred in Not Granting Summary Judgment to
JCCS under Dobbins and Its Progeny.
The district court found the Agreements unenforceable and
therefore did not reach the issue of whether the partially restrictive
covenants are reasonable.38 JCCS contends this is reversible error and that
the district court should have considered whether the covenant satisfies
Dobbins’ reasonableness test.39 JCCS argues that public policy favors its
position because an employer must be able to “protect its client base from
depletion by a former employee.”40 JCCS states, “Montana businesses rely
on the enforceability of covenants like the one here every day.” 41 JCCS
further contends that failing to uphold the covenant in the Agreement
would “preclude Montana businesses from competing in the modern
world.”42

30

Id. at 30–31.
Id. at 31.
32
Id.
33
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 31.
34
Id. at 33–34.
35
Id. at 36.
36
Appellant’s Reply Brief at 13, Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C. v. Alborn, Uithoven,
Riekenberg, P.C., Terry Alborn, Paul Uithoven, Christina Riekenberg, Joe Bateson, and Sherm
Veltkamp , https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/DA%2015-0605%20Appellant%20Reply%20–
%20Brief?id=%7B40DE6753-0000-CF16-9242-C5D987664393%7D (Mont. March 11, 2016) (No.
DA 15-0605).
37
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 36.
38
Id. at 33.
39
Id. at 36.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
31

2016

PRECAP: JCCS V. ALBORN

91

JCCS argues its partially restrictive covenant is enforceable
because it is consistent with the Court’s holding in Dobbins and its
progeny.43 The threshold question in determining enforceability is whether
the covenant is a reasonable restraint on trade.44 JCCS argues that its
covenant is a reasonable restraint on trade because: (1) it is limited in
operation to time and place; (2) is based on good consideration in the
Shareholder’s salary and employment; and (3) affords reasonable
protection for and does not impose an unreasonable burden on the
employer, employee, or the public.45
JCCS also argues it has a legitimate business reason to enforce the
covenants, pursuant to Wrigg.46 A legitimate business reason exists when
the restriction is necessary to protect the employer’s goodwill, customer
relationships, or trade information.47 JCCS acknowledges that precedent
shows covenants are only appropriate when a less restrictive measure will
not suffice and argues there are no less restrictive means to protect JCCS’s
business in this instance.48 JCCS argues the Shareholders gained an unfair
advantage when they solicited JCCS’s customers after voluntarily leaving
their employment with JCCS.49 JCCS contends it intentionally did not
discharge the Shareholders or lock its client lists and confidential
information because it knew doing so would have violated Wrigg and
resulted in no recovery under the covenants.50 JCCS emphasizes that the
Shareholders chose to leave their employment and argues a partial
restriction on trade should be held reasonable when an employee initiates
their termination.51
B. Appellee Alborn, Uithoven, Riekenberg, P.C., Terry Alborn, Paul
Uithoven, Christina Riekenberg, Joe Bateson, and Sherm Veltkamp
1.
The District Court Did Not Err in Granting the Shareholders’
Motion for Summary Judgment Because the Agreements Are
Unenforceable.
The Shareholders contend the district court properly granted
summary judgment because the Agreements did not contain all essential
terms, were “agreements to agree,” and are unconscionable contracts of

Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 22.
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 23, citing Mungas v. Great Falls Clinic, LLP, 221 P.3d
1230 (Mont. 2009).
45
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 24–25.
46
Id. at 25; Wrigg, 265 P.3d at 651.
47
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 26.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 27.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 26–27.
43
44
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adhesion. The Shareholders remind the Court that agreements restraining
a profession are disfavored in Montana.52
The Shareholders argue the Agreements are unenforceable
because they do not contain an essential term to the contract:
compensation.53 The Shareholders contend the compensation term in the
Agreements is incomplete because it fails to “include the Shareholder’s
compensation or a mode or means to calculate it.”54 Additionally, the
Shareholders assert they were not fully compensated because their 2013
bonuses went unpaid after JCCS discovered the Shareholder’s plan to
leave.55 Likewise, the Shareholders argue the district court properly
considered the Agreements as “agreements to agree” because they do not
specify compensation or a means to determine it.56
The Shareholders also contend the Agreements are
unconscionable contracts of adhesion and support their contention with
three main arguments.57 First, the Shareholders argue they had no
meaningful choice but to sign the Agreements because they were
employees in a weaker bargaining position and were forced to sign a
standard form that all shareholders signed without any negotiation.58
Second, the Shareholders argue the terms are more favorable to JCCS for
various reasons, the most prevalent being that the damage payment to
JCCS of 100% of gross fees billed by JCCS to a particular client in the
previous year does not reflect JCCS’s actual damages.59 Third, the
Shareholders argue the covenant not to compete is outside of the
Shareholder’s reasonable expectations because they reasonably believed it
would only apply if the Agreements were terminated—not if the
Agreements expired.60
Finally, the Shareholders argue the covenant not to compete does
not apply to them because it only applies upon termination, not term
expiration, and they were not terminated. Instead, the Agreements had
expired on June 30, 2013.61

Appellee’s Brief, supra note 7, at 12.
Id. at 12–13.
54
Id. at 13.
55
Id. at 14.
56
Id. at 14–15.
57
Id. at 15.
58
Appellee’s Brief, supra note 7, at 17; Appellees’ Brief in Response to Brief of Amici Curiae at 2,
Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C. v. Alborn, Uithoven, Riekenberg, P.C., Terry Alborn,
Paul Uithoven, Christina Riekenberg, Joe Bateson, and Sherm Veltkamp ,
https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/DA%2015-0605%20Supplemental%20–
%20Brief?id=%7B10B62D53-0000-CE13-924C-7F4D95F87002%7D (Mont. Feb. 29, 2016) (No.
DA 15-0605).
59
Appellee’s Brief, supra note 7, at 17.
60
Id. at 19; Appellees’ Brief in Response to Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 58, at 4.
61
Appellee’s Brief, supra note 7, at 19.
52
53
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2.
Even If the Agreements Are Enforceable, the District Court Did
Not Err in Denying JCCS’s Motion for Summary Judgment Because There
Are Genuine Issues of Material Fact.
The Shareholders argue that even if the Court determines the
district court erred in finding the Agreements unenforceable, JCCS’s
motion for summary judgment should still be denied because there are
genuine issues of material fact as to the adequacy of consideration, the
reasonableness of the partially restrictive covenant, and the legitimacy of
JCCS’s business interest.62
The Shareholders contend that if the contract is considered
enforceable, questions of fact exist regarding whether the covenant not to
compete is reasonable.63 The Shareholders argue, pursuant to Dobbins,
Mungas, and Wrigg, the reasonableness of a partially restrictive covenant
is a question of fact and therefore should not be decided on a motion for
summary judgment.64 Additionally, the Shareholders argue that the
liquidated damage clause requires the Shareholders to pay an
unreasonably large amount to JCCS for breach of the covenant.65
The Shareholders also disagree with JCCS’s reported legitimate
business interest in the covenant not to compete.66 The Shareholders argue
JCCS had an opportunity to prepare its Bozeman clients for the
Shareholders’ departure and that JCCS expected the Shareholders to
download their firm’s client list.67 Additionally, the Shareholders argue
JCCS does not have a legitimate business interest to restrict the
Shareholders’ trade because clients have the right to choose their
accountants; therefore, as a matter of public policy, an accountant cannot
be bound by a covenant not to compete that effectively prevents an
accountant from providing services to the client.68 The Shareholders assert
the fact they voluntarily left JCCS is not relevant to JCCS’s legitimate
business reason because the Shareholders worked through the end of their
Agreements, a distinguishing fact from Wrigg.69 Finally, the Shareholders
argue JCCS does not have a legitimate business interest in client
relationships that were gained before the Shareholders joined JCCS, and
many of the clients employed VSB before its merger with JCCS.70
C. Amici Curiae Accounting Firms in Support of Appellant

62

Id. at 24–26, 29.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 25.
65
Id. at 28.
66
Id. at 29.
67
Appellee’s Brief, supra note 7, at 30.
68
Id. at 31; Appellees’ Brief in Response to Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 58, at 7.
69
Appellee’s Brief, supra note 7, at 31.
70
Id. at 32.
63
64
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Eight Montana accounting firms (“Accounting Firms”) filed an
Amicus Brief supporting JCCS.71 The Accounting Firms had regularly
used restrictive covenants and assert the Court’s holding in this case could
impact the restrictive covenants normally utilized in the accounting
profession.72 The Accounting Firms argue the Agreements are not per se
unconscionable contracts of adhesion.73 They support their position by
arguing: (1) the bargaining positions of the parties were not vastly
unequal;74 (2) this type of restrictive covenant is within the reasonable
expectations of Montana accountants;75 (3) this type of restrictive
covenant is not contrary to public policy as a matter of law;76 and (4) the
restrictive covenant does not violate the ethical rules applicable to
accountants.77 The Accounting Firms emphasize this restrictive covenant
is consistent with Dobbins and its progeny because it does not prohibit the
Shareholders from practicing their profession; it just requires them to
compensate JCCS when they take JCCS’s clients to another firm.78
The Accounting Firms also assert the amount of liquidated
damages is reasonable and not unconscionable when comparing the terms
in the present case to those in Dobbins—which were considered
reasonable.79 The Accounting Firms argue that liquidated damages for a
breach of a restrictive covenant are frequently aligned with the cost to
purchase an accounting practice because that is what, in essence, is
occurring.80 The Accounting Firms argue the reasonableness is further
reinforced by the fact the Shareholders can make payments over a threeyear period.81 For these reasons, the Accounting Firms request the Court
reverse the district court’s order to the extent it concludes that the
restrictive covenant is an unconscionable contract of adhesion.82
IV. ANALYSIS
The Court is reviewing this issue de novo and therefore will likely
inquire as to both the enforceability of the Agreements and the
reasonableness of the covenants. The Court will first consider whether the
71

Brief of Amici Curiae Accounting Firms Supporting Appellant at 2, Junkermier, Clark, Campanella,
Stevens, P.C. v. Alborn, Uithoven, Riekenberg, P.C., Terry Alborn, Paul Uithoven, Christina
Riekenberg, Joe Bateson, and Sherm Veltkamp , https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/DA%20150605%20Amicus%20–%20Brief?id=%7BC080B352-0000-CC17-85F2-BB75E2E16085%7D
(Mont. Feb. 5, 2016) (No. DA 15-0605).
72
Id.
73
Id. at 4.
74
Id. at 5.
75
Id. at 6.
76
Id. at 9.
77
Brief of Amici Curiae Accounting Firms, supra note 71, at 13.
78
Id. at 12.
79
Id. at 14, 16.
80
Id. at 17.
81
Id. at 18.
82
Id.
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Agreements are enforceable. If it decides the Agreements are enforceable
it will then consider the legitimacy of the partially restrictive covenants
not to compete.
As to the enforceability, expect questions from the Court
clarifying the compensation term due to its importance for both the
essential term and “agreement to agree” issues. To aid it in determining
whether the contract is an unconscionable contract of adhesion, the Court
may inquire about the Agreement’s one-year term, the procedure for
renewing the term, and the reasonableness of the liquidated damages
provision. JCCS likely has a stronger argument on appeal even though the
district court granted the Shareholders’ motion for summary judgment.
JCCS’s contention that the contract is not an unconscionable contract of
adhesion is well supported in its briefs and further accredited by the
Accounting Firms.
Montana, generally, disfavors restraint on trade. Covenants not to
compete are statutorily barred, subject to only a few exceptions.83 Even
when the statutory exceptions do not apply, the Montana Supreme Court
has permitted indirect covenants not to compete in only a few narrow
instances. In Dobbins v. Rutherford, the Court held a covenant not to
compete enforceable if it is an indirect, reasonable restraint on trade.84 A
reasonable restraint is one that: (1) is restricted in operation as to time or
place; (2) is based on good consideration; and (3) reasonably protects the
employer but does not unreasonably burden the employee or public.85
Dobbins was further narrowed in Wrigg v. Junkermier, Clark,
Campanella, Stevens, P.C., where the Court held a reasonable covenant
not to compete shall only be upheld where the employer can show a
legitimate business interest in enforcing the covenant.86 The Court noted
that an employer “normally lacks a legitimate business interest in a
covenant when it chooses to end the employment relationship.”87 Neither
Wrigg nor any decision since has addressed the issue of whether an
employer has a legitimate business interest in enforcing a covenant when
an employee initiates and voluntarily leaves his or her employment,
leaving a gap in Montana law. That issue is precisely what the Court has
the opportunity to address in this case. The Shareholders left JCCS at their
own volition, and this case is an opportunity for the Court to clarify what
legitimate business interest an employer has when enforcing a covenant
not to compete when the employee leaves the employment relationship.
JCCS makes a convincing argument that, based on Montana case law, this
is the type of legitimate business interest that would support enforcing a
covenant not to compete.
83

See MONT. CODE. ANN. §§ 28–2–703 to 28–2–705 (2015).
Dobbins, 708 P.2d at 580.
85
Id.
86
Wrigg, 265 P.3d at 653.
87
Id. at 653.
84
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If the Court chooses to address this issue, its clarification will aid
attorneys in interpreting Montana’s fact-intensive restrictive covenant
case law. Clarification is important so attorneys may competently draft
covenants not to compete that will be enforced by Montana courts.

